security.md
markdown
| 1 | # Security Architecture — Muse Trust Boundary Reference |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Muse is designed to run at the scale of millions of agent calls per minute. |
| 4 | Every data path that crosses a trust boundary — user input, remote HTTP |
| 5 | responses, manifest keys from the object store, terminal output — is guarded |
| 6 | by an explicit validation primitive. This document describes each guard, |
| 7 | where it applies, and the attack it prevents. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | --- |
| 10 | |
| 11 | ## Table of Contents |
| 12 | |
| 13 | 1. [Threat Model](#threat-model) |
| 14 | 2. [Trust Boundary Design](#trust-boundary-design) |
| 15 | 3. [Validation Module — `muse/core/validation.py`](#validation-module) |
| 16 | 4. [Object ID & Ref ID Validation](#object-id--ref-id-validation) |
| 17 | 5. [Branch Name & Repo ID Validation](#branch-name--repo-id-validation) |
| 18 | 6. [Path Containment — Zip-Slip Defence](#path-containment--zip-slip-defence) |
| 19 | 7. [Display Sanitization — ANSI Injection Defence](#display-sanitization--ansi-injection-defence) |
| 20 | 8. [Glob Injection Prevention](#glob-injection-prevention) |
| 21 | 9. [Numeric Guards](#numeric-guards) |
| 22 | 10. [XML Safety — `muse/core/xml_safe.py`](#xml-safety) |
| 23 | 11. [HTTP Transport Hardening](#http-transport-hardening) |
| 24 | 12. [Snapshot Integrity](#snapshot-integrity) |
| 25 | 13. [Identity Store Security](#identity-store-security) |
| 26 | 14. [Size Caps](#size-caps) |
| 27 | |
| 28 | --- |
| 29 | |
| 30 | ## Threat Model |
| 31 | |
| 32 | Muse's primary threat surface has four entry points: |
| 33 | |
| 34 | | Entry point | Source of untrusted data | |
| 35 | |---|---| |
| 36 | | CLI arguments | User shell input, agent-generated commands | |
| 37 | | Environment variables | CI systems, compromised orchestrators | |
| 38 | | Remote HTTP responses | MuseHub server, MitM attacker | |
| 39 | | On-disk data | Tampered `.muse/` directory, crafted MIDI / MusicXML files | |
| 40 | |
| 41 | At the scale of millions of agents per minute, even a low-probability |
| 42 | exploitation path becomes a near-certainty. Every function that accepts |
| 43 | external data must validate it before use. |
| 44 | |
| 45 | --- |
| 46 | |
| 47 | ## Trust Boundary Design |
| 48 | |
| 49 | Muse uses a layered trust model: |
| 50 | |
| 51 | ``` |
| 52 | External world (untrusted) |
| 53 | | |
| 54 | | CLI args, env vars, HTTP responses, files |
| 55 | v |
| 56 | CLI commands ←──────────────── muse/cli/commands/ |
| 57 | | |
| 58 | | validated, typed data only |
| 59 | v |
| 60 | Core engine ←──────────────── muse/core/ |
| 61 | | |
| 62 | | content-addressed blobs |
| 63 | v |
| 64 | Object store ←──────────────── muse/core/object_store.py |
| 65 | ``` |
| 66 | |
| 67 | **Rule:** data is validated at the point it crosses from the external world |
| 68 | into the CLI layer, or from the network into the core. Internal functions |
| 69 | that call each other do not re-validate data they receive from trusted callers. |
| 70 | |
| 71 | The validation module — `muse/core/validation.py` — sits at the absolute |
| 72 | bottom of the dependency graph. It imports no other Muse module. Every layer |
| 73 | may import it; it imports nothing above itself. |
| 74 | |
| 75 | --- |
| 76 | |
| 77 | ## Validation Module |
| 78 | |
| 79 | **`muse/core/validation.py`** — the single source of all trust-boundary |
| 80 | primitives. |
| 81 | |
| 82 | ``` |
| 83 | muse/core/validation.py |
| 84 | ├── validate_object_id(s) → str | raises ValueError |
| 85 | ├── validate_ref_id(s) → str | raises ValueError |
| 86 | ├── validate_branch_name(name) → str | raises ValueError |
| 87 | ├── validate_repo_id(repo_id) → str | raises ValueError |
| 88 | ├── validate_domain_name(domain)→ str | raises ValueError |
| 89 | ├── contain_path(base, rel) → pathlib.Path | raises ValueError |
| 90 | ├── sanitize_glob_prefix(prefix)→ str (never raises) |
| 91 | ├── sanitize_display(s) → str (never raises) |
| 92 | ├── clamp_int(value, lo, hi) → int | raises ValueError |
| 93 | └── finite_float(value, fallback)→ float (never raises) |
| 94 | ``` |
| 95 | |
| 96 | The convention: functions named `validate_*` raise on bad input; functions |
| 97 | named `sanitize_*` strip bad bytes and always return a safe string. |
| 98 | |
| 99 | --- |
| 100 | |
| 101 | ## Object ID & Ref ID Validation |
| 102 | |
| 103 | **Function:** `validate_object_id(s)` and `validate_ref_id(s)` |
| 104 | **Guard:** enforces exactly 64 lowercase hexadecimal characters. |
| 105 | **Attack prevented:** path traversal via crafted object or commit IDs. |
| 106 | |
| 107 | ### Why this matters |
| 108 | |
| 109 | Object IDs are used to construct filesystem paths: |
| 110 | |
| 111 | ``` |
| 112 | .muse/objects/<id[:2]>/<id[2:]> |
| 113 | .muse/commits/<commit_id>.json |
| 114 | ``` |
| 115 | |
| 116 | A crafted ID such as `../../../etc/passwd` followed by padding would construct |
| 117 | a path outside `.muse/`. Enforcing the 64-char hex format closes this class |
| 118 | of attack completely — no character in `[0-9a-f]{64}` can form a path |
| 119 | separator. |
| 120 | |
| 121 | ### Where applied |
| 122 | |
| 123 | - `object_store.object_path()` — before constructing the shard path |
| 124 | - `object_store.restore_object()` — before reading a blob |
| 125 | - `object_store.write_object()` — verifies the provided ID is valid hex |
| 126 | **and** checks that the written content hashes to the provided ID |
| 127 | (content integrity, not just format integrity) |
| 128 | - `store.resolve_commit_ref()` — sanitizes user-supplied ref before prefix scan |
| 129 | - `store.store_pulled_commit()` — validates commit and snapshot IDs from remote |
| 130 | - `merge_engine.read_merge_state()` — validates IDs read from MERGE_STATE.json |
| 131 | - `merge_engine.apply_resolution()` — validates the resolution object ID |
| 132 | |
| 133 | --- |
| 134 | |
| 135 | ## Branch Name & Repo ID Validation |
| 136 | |
| 137 | **Function:** `validate_branch_name(name)` and `validate_repo_id(repo_id)` |
| 138 | **Guard:** rejects backslashes, null bytes, CR/LF, leading/trailing dots, |
| 139 | consecutive dots, consecutive slashes, leading/trailing slashes, and names |
| 140 | longer than 255 characters. |
| 141 | **Attack prevented:** path traversal via branch names used in ref paths, null |
| 142 | byte injection, and log injection via CR/LF. |
| 143 | |
| 144 | ### Branch name rules |
| 145 | |
| 146 | | Allowed | Rejected | |
| 147 | |---|---| |
| 148 | | `main`, `dev`, `feature/my-branch` | Backslash: `evil\branch` | |
| 149 | | Digits, hyphens, underscores | Null byte: `branch\x00name` | |
| 150 | | Forward slashes (namespacing) | CR or LF: `branch\rname` | |
| 151 | | Up to 255 characters | Leading dot: `.hidden` | |
| 152 | | | Trailing dot: `branch.` | |
| 153 | | | Consecutive dots: `branch..name` | |
| 154 | | | Consecutive slashes: `feat//branch` | |
| 155 | | | Leading or trailing slash | |
| 156 | |
| 157 | ### Where applied |
| 158 | |
| 159 | - `cli/commands/init.py` — `--default-branch` and `--domain` arguments |
| 160 | - `cli/commands/commit.py` — HEAD branch detection (HEAD-poisoning guard) |
| 161 | - `cli/commands/branch.py` — creation and deletion targets |
| 162 | - `cli/commands/checkout.py` — new branch creation via `-b` |
| 163 | - `cli/commands/merge.py` — target branch name |
| 164 | - `cli/commands/reset.py` — branch before writing the ref file |
| 165 | - `store.get_head_commit_id()` — branch from the ref layer |
| 166 | |
| 167 | --- |
| 168 | |
| 169 | ## Path Containment — Zip-Slip Defence |
| 170 | |
| 171 | **Function:** `contain_path(base: pathlib.Path, rel: str) -> pathlib.Path` |
| 172 | **Guard:** joins `base / rel`, resolves symlinks, then asserts the result is |
| 173 | inside `base`. |
| 174 | **Attack prevented:** zip-slip (path traversal via manifest keys or |
| 175 | user-supplied relative paths). |
| 176 | |
| 177 | ### The zip-slip attack |
| 178 | |
| 179 | A malicious archive or snapshot manifest can contain a key like |
| 180 | `../../.ssh/authorized_keys`. If the restore loop does: |
| 181 | |
| 182 | ```python |
| 183 | dest = workdir / manifest_key |
| 184 | dest.write_bytes(blob) |
| 185 | ``` |
| 186 | |
| 187 | …then a crafted key writes outside the working directory. `contain_path` |
| 188 | closes this by checking: |
| 189 | |
| 190 | ```python |
| 191 | resolved = (base / rel).resolve() |
| 192 | if not resolved.is_relative_to(base.resolve()): |
| 193 | raise ValueError("Path traversal detected") |
| 194 | ``` |
| 195 | |
| 196 | ### Symlink escape |
| 197 | |
| 198 | `contain_path` resolves symlinks before the containment check. A symlink |
| 199 | inside `state/` that points to `/etc/passwd` would resolve to a path |
| 200 | outside `state/`, causing `contain_path` to raise before any data is |
| 201 | written. |
| 202 | |
| 203 | ### Where applied |
| 204 | |
| 205 | - `cli/commands/checkout.py` — `_checkout_snapshot()` for every restored file |
| 206 | - `cli/commands/merge.py` — `_restore_from_manifest()` for every restored file |
| 207 | - `cli/commands/reset.py` — `--hard` reset restore loop |
| 208 | - `cli/commands/revert.py` — revert restore loop |
| 209 | - `cli/commands/cherry_pick.py` — cherry-pick restore loop |
| 210 | - `cli/commands/stash.py` — `stash pop` restore loop |
| 211 | - All 7 semantic write commands (arpeggiate, humanize, invert, quantize, |
| 212 | retrograde, velocity_normalize, midi_shard) — output file paths |
| 213 | - `merge_engine.read_merge_state()` — conflict path list from MERGE_STATE.json |
| 214 | - `merge_engine.apply_resolution()` — resolution target file path |
| 215 | |
| 216 | --- |
| 217 | |
| 218 | ## Display Sanitization — ANSI Injection Defence |
| 219 | |
| 220 | **Function:** `sanitize_display(s: str) -> str` |
| 221 | **Guard:** strips all C0 control characters except `\t` and `\n`, plus DEL |
| 222 | (`\x7f`) and C1 control characters (`\x80–\x9f`). |
| 223 | **Attack prevented:** ANSI/OSC terminal escape injection via commit messages, |
| 224 | branch names, author fields, and other user-controlled strings echoed to the |
| 225 | terminal. |
| 226 | |
| 227 | ### The attack |
| 228 | |
| 229 | A commit message like: |
| 230 | |
| 231 | ``` |
| 232 | Add feature\x1b]2;Hacked terminal title\x07 (harmless-looking) |
| 233 | ``` |
| 234 | |
| 235 | …would, when echoed to a terminal, silently change the terminal's title bar or |
| 236 | execute other OSC/CSI sequences. At millions of agent calls per minute, a |
| 237 | malicious agent could systematically inject escape sequences into commit |
| 238 | messages that other users' terminals execute. |
| 239 | |
| 240 | ### Characters stripped |
| 241 | |
| 242 | | Code point | Name | Why stripped | |
| 243 | |---|---|---| |
| 244 | | `\x00–\x08` | C0 (NUL to BS) | Control bytes; no legitimate use in display | |
| 245 | | `\x0b–\x0c` | VT, FF | Not standard line breaks; terminal control | |
| 246 | | `\x0d` | CR | Cursor return — log injection | |
| 247 | | `\x0e–\x1a` | SO to SUB | Control shift codes | |
| 248 | | `\x1b` | ESC | ANSI escape sequence start | |
| 249 | | `\x1c–\x1f` | FS to US | Control separators | |
| 250 | | `\x7f` | DEL | Backspace-style control | |
| 251 | | `\x80–\x9f` | C1 | CSI (`\x9b`) and other C1 escape starters | |
| 252 | |
| 253 | **Preserved:** `\t` (tab) and `\n` (newline) — legitimate in commit messages. |
| 254 | |
| 255 | ### Where applied |
| 256 | |
| 257 | All `typer.echo()` paths that output user-controlled strings: |
| 258 | `log`, `tag`, `branch`, `checkout`, `merge`, `reset`, `revert`, |
| 259 | `cherry_pick`, `commit`, `find_phrase`, `agent_map`. |
| 260 | |
| 261 | --- |
| 262 | |
| 263 | ## Glob Injection Prevention |
| 264 | |
| 265 | **Function:** `sanitize_glob_prefix(prefix: str) -> str` |
| 266 | **Guard:** strips the glob metacharacters `*`, `?`, `[`, `]`, `{`, `}` from |
| 267 | a string before it is used in a `pathlib.Path.glob()` pattern. |
| 268 | **Attack prevented:** glob injection turning a targeted prefix lookup into an |
| 269 | arbitrary filesystem scan. |
| 270 | |
| 271 | The function `_find_commit_by_prefix()` in `store.py` constructs: |
| 272 | |
| 273 | ```python |
| 274 | list(commits_dir.glob(f"{sanitized}*.json")) |
| 275 | ``` |
| 276 | |
| 277 | Without sanitization, a crafted prefix like `**/*` would enumerate the |
| 278 | entire directory tree rooted at `.muse/commits/`. |
| 279 | |
| 280 | --- |
| 281 | |
| 282 | ## Numeric Guards |
| 283 | |
| 284 | **Function:** `clamp_int(value, lo, hi, name)` and `finite_float(value, fallback)` |
| 285 | **Guard:** raises `ValueError` for out-of-range integers; returns `fallback` |
| 286 | for `Inf` / `-Inf` / `NaN` floats. |
| 287 | **Attack prevented:** resource exhaustion via large numeric arguments; NaN |
| 288 | propagation causing silent computation corruption. |
| 289 | |
| 290 | ### Where applied |
| 291 | |
| 292 | | Command | Flag | Bounds | |
| 293 | |---|---|---| |
| 294 | | `muse log` | `--max-count` | ≥ 1 | |
| 295 | | `muse find_phrase` | `--depth` | 1–10,000 | |
| 296 | | `muse agent_map` | `--depth` | 1–10,000 | |
| 297 | | `muse find_phrase` | `--min-score` | 0.0–1.0 | |
| 298 | | `muse humanize` | `--timing` | ≤ 1.0 beat | |
| 299 | | `muse humanize` | `--velocity` | ≤ 127 | |
| 300 | | `muse invert` | `--pivot` | 0–127 (MIDI note range) | |
| 301 | | MIDI parser | `tempo` | guard against `tempo=0` (division by zero) | |
| 302 | | MIDI parser | `divisions` | guard against negative or zero values | |
| 303 | |
| 304 | --- |
| 305 | |
| 306 | ## XML Safety |
| 307 | |
| 308 | **Module:** `muse/core/xml_safe.py` |
| 309 | **Guard:** wraps `defusedxml.ElementTree.parse()` behind a typed `SafeET` |
| 310 | class. |
| 311 | **Attack prevented:** Billion Laughs (entity expansion DoS), XXE (external |
| 312 | entity credential theft), and SSRF via XML. |
| 313 | |
| 314 | ### The attacks |
| 315 | |
| 316 | **Billion Laughs:** |
| 317 | A DTD-defined entity that expands to another entity, repeated exponentially. |
| 318 | Parsing a single small file consumes gigabytes of memory. |
| 319 | |
| 320 | **XXE (XML External Entity):** |
| 321 | ```xml |
| 322 | <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> |
| 323 | <root>&xxe;</root> |
| 324 | ``` |
| 325 | The parser fetches the file and embeds its contents in the parse tree. With a |
| 326 | `SYSTEM "http://..."` URL, it becomes an SSRF vector. |
| 327 | |
| 328 | ### Why a typed wrapper |
| 329 | |
| 330 | `defusedxml` does not ship type stubs. Importing it directly requires a |
| 331 | `# type: ignore` comment, which the project's zero-ignore rule bans. |
| 332 | `xml_safe.py` contains the single justified crossing of the typed/untyped |
| 333 | boundary and re-exports all necessary stdlib `ElementTree` types with full |
| 334 | type information. |
| 335 | |
| 336 | ```python |
| 337 | # Instead of: |
| 338 | import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET # unsafe — no XXE protection |
| 339 | ET.parse("score.xml") |
| 340 | |
| 341 | # Use: |
| 342 | from muse.core.xml_safe import SafeET |
| 343 | SafeET.parse("score.xml") # fully typed, XXE-safe |
| 344 | ``` |
| 345 | |
| 346 | --- |
| 347 | |
| 348 | ## HTTP Transport Hardening |
| 349 | |
| 350 | **Module:** `muse/core/transport.py` — `HttpTransport` |
| 351 | |
| 352 | ### Redirect refusal |
| 353 | |
| 354 | `_STRICT_OPENER` is a `urllib.request.OpenerDirector` built with a custom |
| 355 | `_NoRedirectHandler` that raises on any HTTP redirect. This prevents: |
| 356 | |
| 357 | - **Authorization header leakage** — a redirect to a different host would |
| 358 | carry the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header to the attacker's server. |
| 359 | - **Scheme downgrade** — a redirect from `https://` to `http://` would |
| 360 | expose the bearer token over cleartext. |
| 361 | |
| 362 | ### HTTPS enforcement |
| 363 | |
| 364 | `_build_request()` uses `urllib.parse.urlparse(url).scheme` to check for |
| 365 | HTTPS. A URL that uses any other scheme raises before a connection is |
| 366 | attempted. |
| 367 | |
| 368 | ### Response size cap |
| 369 | |
| 370 | `_execute()` reads at most `MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES` (64 MB) from any HTTP |
| 371 | response. If a `Content-Length` header declares a larger body, the request is |
| 372 | rejected before reading begins. This prevents OOM attacks via an unbounded |
| 373 | response body. |
| 374 | |
| 375 | ### Content-Type guard |
| 376 | |
| 377 | `_assert_json_content(raw, endpoint)` checks that the first non-whitespace |
| 378 | byte of a response body is `{` or `[` before calling `json.loads()`. This |
| 379 | catches HTML error pages (proxy intercept pages, Cloudflare challenges) that |
| 380 | would otherwise produce a misleading `JSONDecodeError`. |
| 381 | |
| 382 | --- |
| 383 | |
| 384 | ## Local File Transport Hardening |
| 385 | |
| 386 | **Module:** `muse/core/transport.py` — `LocalFileTransport` |
| 387 | |
| 388 | `LocalFileTransport` handles `file://` URLs — direct filesystem reads and |
| 389 | writes between two Muse repositories on the same host (or a shared network |
| 390 | mount). Because all I/O is local, the threat surface shifts from network |
| 391 | attacks to filesystem attacks. |
| 392 | |
| 393 | ### Symlink canonicalisation |
| 394 | |
| 395 | `_repo_root()` calls `pathlib.Path.resolve()` on the path extracted from the |
| 396 | URL before any filesystem operation. `resolve()` dereferences all symlinks |
| 397 | and normalises `..` path components. |
| 398 | |
| 399 | **Attack prevented:** a crafted `file://` URL or a pre-placed symlink at the |
| 400 | URL target that points to a sensitive directory (one without `.muse/`) is |
| 401 | rejected because the containment check is made on the *canonical* resolved |
| 402 | path, not the symlink itself. |
| 403 | |
| 404 | ### Branch name validation |
| 405 | |
| 406 | `push_pack()` calls `validate_branch_name(branch)` before any I/O. This |
| 407 | rejects: |
| 408 | |
| 409 | | Input | Why rejected | |
| 410 | |---|---| |
| 411 | | `../evil` | Leading `..` traversal | |
| 412 | | `foo\x00bar` | Null byte injection | |
| 413 | | `branch\revil` | CR log injection | |
| 414 | | `main\\escape` | Backslash path separator | |
| 415 | | `foo..bar` | Consecutive dots | |
| 416 | | `""` (empty) | Cannot form a valid ref path | |
| 417 | |
| 418 | ### Ref path containment |
| 419 | |
| 420 | Even after `validate_branch_name` passes, the branch name is joined onto the |
| 421 | `.muse/refs/heads/` base path and validated with `contain_path()`. |
| 422 | |
| 423 | `contain_path()` resolves symlinks on the *result* path and asserts it is |
| 424 | relative to the base directory. This provides defence-in-depth against: |
| 425 | |
| 426 | - **Pre-placed symlinks** — an attacker who can write to `.muse/refs/heads/` |
| 427 | before a push could place a symlink named after a legitimate branch that |
| 428 | points outside the directory. `contain_path()` resolves that symlink and |
| 429 | rejects the write. |
| 430 | - **Future branch-name edge cases** — any branch name that somehow passes |
| 431 | `validate_branch_name` but resolves outside `refs/heads/` is still caught. |
| 432 | |
| 433 | ### Where applied |
| 434 | |
| 435 | | Guard | Function | Attack prevented | |
| 436 | |---|---|---| |
| 437 | | `resolve()` | `_repo_root()` | Symlink traversal on URL path | |
| 438 | | `validate_branch_name()` | `push_pack()` | Branch-as-path injection | |
| 439 | | `contain_path()` | `push_pack()` | Pre-placed symlink in refs/heads/ | |
| 440 | |
| 441 | --- |
| 442 | |
| 443 | ## Snapshot Integrity |
| 444 | |
| 445 | **Module:** `muse/core/snapshot.py` |
| 446 | |
| 447 | ### Null-byte separators in hash computation |
| 448 | |
| 449 | `compute_snapshot_id()` and `compute_commit_id()` hash a canonical |
| 450 | representation of the manifest. The separator between key and value is the |
| 451 | null byte (`\x00`) rather than a printable character like `|` or `:`. |
| 452 | |
| 453 | **Why this matters:** if the separator is `:`, then a file named `a:b` with |
| 454 | object ID `c` and a file named `a` with object ID `b:c` produce the same hash |
| 455 | input. The null byte cannot appear in filenames on POSIX or Windows, making |
| 456 | collisions structurally impossible. |
| 457 | |
| 458 | ### Symlink and hidden-file exclusion |
| 459 | |
| 460 | `walk_workdir()` skips: |
| 461 | - **Symlinks** — following symlinks during snapshot could include files |
| 462 | outside the working directory, leaking content. |
| 463 | - **Hidden files and directories** (names starting with `.`) — `.muse/` must |
| 464 | never be snapshotted; other dotfiles (`.env`, `.git`) are excluded to prevent |
| 465 | accidental credential capture. |
| 466 | |
| 467 | --- |
| 468 | |
| 469 | ## Identity Store Security |
| 470 | |
| 471 | **Module:** `muse/core/identity.py` |
| 472 | |
| 473 | The identity store (`~/.muse/identity.toml`) holds bearer tokens. Several |
| 474 | layered controls protect it: |
| 475 | |
| 476 | | Control | Implementation | Threat prevented | |
| 477 | |---|---|---| |
| 478 | | **0o700 directory** | `os.chmod(~/.muse/, 0o700)` | Other local users cannot list or traverse the directory | |
| 479 | | **0o600 from byte zero** | `os.open()` + `os.fchmod()` before writing | Eliminates the TOCTOU window that `write_text()` + `chmod()` creates | |
| 480 | | **Atomic rename** | Temp file + `os.replace()` | A crash or kill signal during write leaves the old file intact — never a partial file | |
| 481 | | **Symlink guard** | Check `path.is_symlink()` before write | Blocks pre-placed symlink attacks targeting a different credential file | |
| 482 | | **Exclusive write lock** | `fcntl.flock(LOCK_EX)` on `.identity.lock` | Prevents race conditions when parallel agents write simultaneously | |
| 483 | | **Token masking** | All log calls use `"Bearer ***"` | Tokens never appear in log output | |
| 484 | | **URL normalisation** | `_hostname_from_url()` strips scheme, userinfo, path | `https://admin:secret@musehub.ai/repos/x` and `musehub.ai` resolve to the same key | |
| 485 | |
| 486 | --- |
| 487 | |
| 488 | ## Size Caps |
| 489 | |
| 490 | | Constant | Value | Where enforced | |
| 491 | |---|---|---| |
| 492 | | `MAX_FILE_BYTES` | 256 MB | `object_store.read_object()` — cap per-blob reads | |
| 493 | | `MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES` | 64 MB | `transport._execute()` — cap HTTP response body | |
| 494 | | `MAX_SYSEX_BYTES` | 64 KiB | `midi_merge._msg_to_dict()` — cap SysEx data per message | |
| 495 | | MIDI file size | `MAX_FILE_BYTES` | `midi_parser.parse_file()` — cap file size before parse | |
| 496 | |
| 497 | --- |
| 498 | |
| 499 | *See also:* |
| 500 | |
| 501 | - [`docs/reference/auth.md`](auth.md) — identity lifecycle (`muse auth`) |
| 502 | - [`docs/reference/hub.md`](hub.md) — hub connection management (`muse hub`) |
| 503 | - [`docs/reference/remotes.md`](remotes.md) — push, fetch, clone transport |
| 504 | - [`muse/core/validation.py`](../../muse/core/validation.py) — implementation |
| 505 | - [`tests/test_core_validation.py`](../../tests/test_core_validation.py) — test suite |